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Assessment-based school accountability reforms have swept through the states, often 
including both new standardized tests for students and consequences for teachers, schools, and 
districts.  Beginning with state level reforms that varied in strength and composition, school 
accountability has become more standardized with the passage at the national level of the No 
Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB).  The expressed purpose of these reforms has been to 
promote educational achievement and reduce the disparity in educational opportunities between 
students.  Encouragingly, several studies suggest that the state-level accountability reforms have 
increased student achievement (Carnoy and Loeb 2003, Hanushek and Raymond 2005).  
Similarly, the National Assessment of Educational Progress shows gains in mathematics and 
reading performance for 9 year olds and in mathematics performance for 13 year olds nationally 
during the past decade, perhaps as a result of standards and accountability.1 
School reforms inherently affect school personnel as well as students.  Recent reforms 
likely constitute substantial changes in teachers’ and principals’ work lives, including increased 
scrutiny in the classroom, a more intense focus on student performance, and direct consequences 
for school funding and management.  These changes, in turn, may affect career decisions about 
whether to join the profession, where to work, and, once working, whether to transfer to another 
school (migration) or to leave the profession (attrition).  Likewise, recent reforms may help 
administrators identify and replace ineffective teachers and principals.   
As for any profession, turnover of personnel can be both beneficial and harmful.  What 
matters is who is leaving and who is taking their place.  Turnover of school staff will work 
against reform goals if the best and brightest are influenced to leave and are replaced by lesser 
qualified individuals.  On the other hand, schools will benefit from reform if it helps to weed out 
ineffective staff.  Answers to some specific questions are needed in order to evaluate the reforms 
implemented by NCLB: (1) Are school staff voluntarily quitting their jobs due to reforms?  If so, 
who is leaving and which reform mechanisms are causing them to leave?  (2) Have reforms 
allowed administrators to replace ineffective staff?  (3) How strong is the pool of replacement 
staff?  Are the new teachers and administrators of high quality?  (4) What are the likely long-run 
                                                 
1 (http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/ltt/results2004/nat-reading-scalescore.asp, 
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/ltt/results2004/nat-math-scalescore.asp).  There was little change in reading for 
13 year olds.  For 17 year olds there was no change in mathematics and a very slight decline in reading. 
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effects of reforms?  Are any observed effects of reforms on turnover a one-time occurrence or 
are they likely to persist?  
  The purpose of the paper is to study changes in turnover rates among teachers, 
principals, and pupil-services personnel in response to assessment and accountability systems, as 
required by Section 1503 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, reauthorized by the 
No Child Left Behind Act.  The paper reviews past research and presents new empirical 
evidence.  Unfortunately, there is yet little empirical evidence on the effects of NCLB reforms.  
This paper therefore draws evidence from pre-NCLB accountability and assessment reforms and 
discusses how these results can help predict the likely affect that NCLB will have.  
Accountability and assessment systems will likely affect teachers and principals in different 
ways – in fact, many systems were designed with these differences in mind.  Therefore, the next 
section of this report addresses teachers’ labor responses to accountability reforms while section 
III describes principals’ responses.  
 
II. Teacher Turnover  
1.  Overview 
Clearly, there are reasons that teachers may be dissatisfied with assessment-based 
accountability reforms.  Interview and survey research suggests that teachers feel pressure to 
deliver high student test scores (Barksdale-Ladd & Thomas, 2000; Hoffman, Assaf, & Paris, 
2001).  In addition, many teachers indicate that they view the high-stakes tests as an imposition 
on their professional autonomy, an invasion into their classrooms, a message that the state views 
them as incompetent, and a hindrance to professional creativity (Luna & Turner, 2001).  As 
districts and schools put more emphasis on test performance, teachers may lose flexibility in 
their classrooms. They may face pressures to teach topics that they are less interested in or 
believe are less important for students, or they may need to teach in ways that increase test scores 
but not other important skills. Teachers also may have more day-to-day distractions as parents 
and administrators scrutinize the details of their classrooms.  In addition, teachers may worry 
about the security of their jobs, particularly if they teach in schools with low-performing 
students, which are more likely to encounter repercussions from the state.  New teachers may be 
especially vulnerable to the additional burdens placed on them by high-stakes testing and 
accountability systems.  Given the already high propensity to quit and desire to be effective with 
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their students among new teachers (Johnson and Birkeland 2002), additional scrutiny and the 
threat of sanctions can easily further dissuade new teachers from staying in the field through the 
arguably hardest first few years of teaching.  More experienced teachers, alternatively, may 
respond more strongly to the changes because new teachers enter with little familiarity with older 
policies while experienced teachers undergo changes while on the job. 
Yet, this increased emphasis on accountability and rewards may not be all bad for 
teachers.  Standards-based reforms can provide opportunities for schools to focus on student 
learning. While this was sure to have been the case in many schools prior to the recent reforms, 
there were other, poorly functioning, schools that were occupied in other ways.  Administrators 
may use accountability policies as leverage with the district to get rid of ineffective or distracting 
teachers and may simply focus more on trying to create a school that benefits students.  Teachers 
may prefer to teach in these environments rather than in environments that do not recognize 
success in the classroom.  In addition, as a result of the pressures on schools, administrators may 
encourage their best teachers to move into the grades and fields where testing is mandatory, in 
hopes of raising their schools’ scores.  One way to encourage such reassignment of teachers, for 
example, would be to target additional resources to the tested grades and subject areas.  If this 
were the case, we may see high-quality teachers moving into jobs that most directly impact 
student scores on the standardized tests. 
Thus, it is unclear, a priori, how the recent reforms will affect teachers. They may 
dissuade potential teachers from entering the classroom, increase transfers, or may increase the 
probability that teachers will quit. These effects may be greatest in low-performing schools that 
already have difficulty attracting and retaining well-qualified teachers.  However, the effects may 
work in the exact opposite direction if testing and accountability have made teaching more 
satisfying, especially in schools that had been mismanaged prior to reform. 
To date, two prior studies, one in New York and one in North Carolina, estimate the 
effects accountability and assessment on teacher turnover.  The New York study finds that the 
introduction of testing did not increase turnover in the tested grades.  The North Carolina study, 
however, finds that turnover increased more in high poverty than in low poverty schools after the 
introduction of accountability, though it does not establish that accountability caused this change.  
The work of this report adds to this small literature by directly estimating reform-influenced 
teacher turnover at the national level.  It finds that, compared to other reasons for leaving, 
 4 
accountability reforms have had a relatively small influence on teacher turnover.  Reforms have 
affected different teachers to different degrees and in different ways though overall the effects 
are small.  Specific differentials include: (1) highly experienced teachers are more likely than 
new teachers to quit because they disagree with new reforms, (2) new teachers are more likely 
than more experienced teachers to quit because they do not believe that they are prepared to 
implement new reforms, (3) teachers in urban schools and largely minority schools are more 
likely than teachers in other schools to both disagree with and be unprepared to implement new 
reform measures, and (4) teachers are much more likely to be fired in post-reform years than pre-
reform. 
 
2. Review of Literature 
The few case studies mentioned above have informed researchers about the channels 
through which assessment-based accountability reforms can impact the motivation and behavior 
of teachers.  A general finding of this descriptive literature is that not only the type of reform, but 
how it is implemented, is of paramount importance to teachers’ satisfaction.  Teachers value 
cohesive, supportive work environments that acknowledge their efforts to promote student 
achievement (Johnson and Birkeland (2002), Luna and Turner 2001, Heneman 1998).  
Therefore, reforms, to the extent that they positively or negatively influence these aspects of the 
work place, will likely influence migration and attrition decisions.  While these studies provide 
insights into the mechanisms by which accountability reforms could affect teachers’ decisions, 
they do not directly assess the extent to which these reforms have actually impacted teachers’ 
careers.  Two empirical studies, Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2006) and Clotfelter, 
Ladd, Vigdor, and Diaz (2004), directly measure these effects and are reviewed below. 
 
Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2006) 
Beginning in the 1998-99 academic year, New York State instituted a revised student 
assessment system that reflected higher learning standards and included mandatory tests in 
English Language Arts and Mathematics for grades four and eight.  The content of the tests is 
tied to curriculum that is intended to lead to a high school exit exam, and the results of the tests 
are publicly reported.  In this paper, the authors examine the effect that the introduction of testing 
in the 4th grade had on teachers’ career decisions.  Surprisingly, they find that the probability of 
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turnover (whether to teach in another grade or to exit teaching altogether) was lower for fourth 
grade teachers in testing years compared to other elementary school teachers. 
The study uses demographic, school, and career information on every 1st through 6th 
grade teacher who was a part of the New York State public school system any time between the 
1994-95 and 2001-02 school years.2  This eight-year record surrounding the implementation of 
the test allows the researchers to track individual teachers across grades and schools over the 
course of their employment in any New York State public school, identifying the grade-level 
taught both before and after the implementation of testing.  Three specific questions addressed 
by the authors are: 1) Did the introduction of testing in the fourth grade increase the turnover of 
fourth grade teachers?  2) Did testing differentially affect turnover for fourth grade teachers with 
different characteristics?  3) Did the new testing system affect what types of teachers decided to 
enter fourth grade? 
 In order to isolate the effect of testing from other contemporaneous policies or economic 
changes that could possibly affect turnover, the authors exploit the fact that testing was targeted 
at fourth grade teachers, while any other changes likely affected all elementary school teachers 
equally.  They therefore compare turnover probabilities between test-exposed fourth grade 
teachers and other elementary school teachers in non-tested grades.  In this way, the approach 
utilizes the variation in the testing policy by grade and relies on differences across grades to 
identify the policy’s effects.   
1. Has the introduction of testing in the fourth grade increased the turnover of fourth 
grade teachers?  Using the entire universe of first through sixth grade teachers who taught in 
New York State between 1994 and 2001, the authors estimate a logit model predicting the 
probability a teacher will leave the grade he or she taught that year, as a function of teacher and 
school characteristics.  Interaction terms between teaching in the fourth grade and post-reform 
years capture the differential impact testing had on the exit propensities of fourth grade teachers 
after implementation of the tests.  The model is further estimated for subsets of teachers split by 
geographic location (urban, suburban, or rural) and by school-level student test performance.  
                                                 
2 The core data come from the Personnel Master File (PMF), part of the Basic Education Data System of the New 
York State Education Department. The NYS Teacher Certification Database (TCERT) combined with the Barron’s 
ranking of college selectivity, provide a measure of college selectivity. The NYS Teacher Certification Exam 
History File (EHF) provides teacher certification exam scores of individual teachers and whether they passed the 
exams on their first attempts. A school-level dataset adds information on the location, grade span, student 
composition, and student performance for each school. 
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Table 1 shows the odds ratio of the interaction of fourth grade teacher with post-reform years for 
various model specifications3.  Contrary to the popular belief that the burden of testing will 
increase turnover, the authors find that fourth grade teachers in post-reform years are 
significantly less likely to leave the grade, compared to teachers in other elementary grades and 
years.  This reduced turnover is evident across all geographical locations and quartiles of student 
test performance. 
 2. Has the introduction of testing in the fourth grade differentially affected the turnover 
of teachers with different characteristics?   The authors expand the previous model accounting 
for the possibility that testing had a differential effect on fourth grade teachers with different 
levels of teaching experience and ability.  Here, ability is measured by the competitiveness of a 
teacher’s undergraduate institution and whether they failed a teacher certification exam.  Table 2 
summarizes results for some model specifications, reporting odds ratios of the relevant 
interaction terms.  When compared with first year teachers, more experienced teachers are more 
likely to leave the fourth grade post-reform.  However, this effect is confined to suburban and 
high-achieving schools.  The authors speculate that this differential leaving by more experienced 
teachers may be due to an unwillingness to change teaching styles or curriculum to conform to 
test requirements.  Differential, post-reform turnover patterns among teachers with varying 
college backgrounds are also evident.  On average, teachers from the most competitive colleges 
are less likely to leave fourth grade post-reform compared to those from less-competitive 
colleges.  Again, this effect is driven by the reduced exit of these high-ability teachers from 
suburban and high-achieving schools.  Whether this differential is due to teachers themselves or 
administrative decisions, this is evidence that testing has had the positive influence of keeping 
high quality teachers in tested grades.  
3. Have the characteristics of teachers entering the fourth grade changed with the 
introduction of testing?  Looking at the subset of teachers who are new to any grade, the authors 
test to see whether new, post-reform fourth grade teachers were significantly different than other 
teachers new to a grade.  Table 3 shows coefficient estimates of the interaction between teaching 
fourth grade and being in a post-reform year in these models.  This term measures the extent to 
which teachers new to the fourth grade in a testing year are more or less likely to have the 
specified characteristic relative to other teachers new to a grade.  The table shows that teachers 
                                                 
3 For details see Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2006). 
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new to the fourth grade are less likely to be first year or very experienced teachers, while they 
are more likely to have one to four years of experience prior to the start of the school year.  
There is also some evidence that teachers new to the fourth grade are more likely to have 
attended a highly competitive college, although this result is only statistically significant for 
teachers in low-achieving schools.  This last finding may be a result of administrative attempts to 
place better teachers in classrooms whose performance on state tests will represent the overall 
performance of the school.  While this may be beneficial for the tested grades, other students 
may suffer to the extent it draws high quality teachers away from other grades. 
In summary, the results of Boyd, Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff (2006) contradict the 
popularly-held belief that teachers tend to leave grades that are subject to state-sanctioned 
standardized tests.  In fact, post-reform, fourth grade teachers were less likely to leave the grade, 
compared with teachers in all other grades and years.  Moreover, this result is robust for teachers 
in schools across the range of student achievement and urbanicity.  High-quality administrative 
data and a wide variety of schools and communities in New York State made for an excellent 
environment in which to explore the effect of testing on teacher turnover.  The implementation of 
testing in just one elementary grade allowed the authors to isolate the effect of this reform from 
other contemporaneous economic and political factors.  A drawback to this approach, however, 
is that the effect of assessment may extend beyond the tested grades.  In this case, a comparison 
between the tested and non-tested grades would miss some, if not all, of the effects of the reform 
on teachers’ labor decisions.  Although there are clearly benefits to this analysis, it alone cannot 
be definitive.  Assessment-based accountability reforms vary across states and, in particular, 
New York’s system does not have direct repercussions for teachers, such as increased pay for 
higher performance or sanctions for underperformance.  Therefore, while this study suggests that 
testing in and of itself does not exacerbate teacher turnover, it can not address whether other 
assessment-based repercussions implemented either by states or NCLB could illicit different 
responses. 
 
Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor, and Diaz (2004) 
In contrast to New York’s straightforward assessment policy lies the accountability 
system implemented in North Carolina in the 1996-97 academic year.  This sophisticated system 
provided the opportunity to examine two other common mechanisms used to hold schools 
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accountable for student performance, namely, the labeling of low-performing schools and merit 
pay for exemplary achievement.  Students in kindergarten through 8th grade were tested each 
year and, using a combination of the average level of student achievement and the yearly change 
in average test scores, schools are ranked as “exemplary”, “no recognition”, or “low-
performing”.  Low-performing schools fail to meet both the state-mandated standard for growth 
in test scores and have more than 50 percent of their students performing below grade level.  
Exemplary school meet both of these requirements and teachers in those schools are rewarded 
with a bonus of $1500.  Low-performing schools are labeled as such and administrators are 
pressured to improve.  One drawback of a system like this is that it gives teachers the incentive, 
all else equal, to work for the school that is most likely to receive an “exemplary” status and 
hence receive the pecuniary bonus.  Given that high quality teachers are in greater demand than 
those of low quality, and therefore have a comparative advantage in choosing the school they 
wish to work in, this merit pay policy may give the best teachers an incentive to leave low-
performing schools for high-performing ones.  Thus, this policy could exacerbate the current 
problem low-performing schools have in retaining high-quality teachers.  While the labeling of 
schools as “low performing” may induce teachers and administrators to work harder, it may also 
have the unintended consequence of deepening the incentive for teachers at these schools to flee.  
The authors therefore explore the hypothesis that this accountability system has differentially 
influenced the exit decisions of teachers from low-performing schools. 
The data for this study includes information on all teachers and their students in North 
Carolina between 1994 and 2001.  The authors estimate whether teachers are more likely to quit 
low-performing schools, are more likely to quit post-reform, and are more likely to quit low-
performing schools differentially post-reform.  Table 4 replicates Table 3 from their paper.  For a 
typical teacher with 10 years of experience working in low performing schools prior to the 
reform, the probability of leaving the school was approximately 17.6 percent.  After the reform 
this increased to 19.1 percent.  This 1.5 percentage point increase compares to a 0.5 percentage 
point increase for teachers who were not in low-performing schools.  For new teachers, the 
change was 5.1 percentage points for low performing schools and 0.8 percentage points for those 
in other schools. The increase in the probability of leaving was even greater for those low-
performing schools labeled as such by the state.   Following reform, low-performing schools saw 
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a substantially greater increase in the turnover rate of their teachers than did higher performing 
schools. 
In another part of their analysis, the authors assess whether the characteristics of teachers 
changed following reform.  As shown in Table 5 (Table 6 in the paper), they find little difference 
between the changes in low-performing and higher-performing schools.  Low-performing 
schools were more likely than other schools to have novice teachers prior to accountability (38 
percent vs. 30 percent), but this tendency did not increase following reform.  However, the 
trends in the percent of novice teachers did change. The four years prior to reform show a drop 
in novice teachers and teachers from non-competitive college in low-performing schools. This 
trend did not continue in the years following reform. The change in trends before and after 
reform is not evident in higher-performing schools, although due to large standard errors the 
differences between school types are not statistically significant. This result is suggestive, but not 
confirmatory, of a negative effect of reform on the qualifications of teachers in low-performing 
schools. 
However, while the results are suggestive, they are not strong evidence of the effects of 
accountability.  Low-performing schools face a greater difficulty in attracting and retaining 
teachers even without accountability reforms. As such, they are more susceptible to changes in 
the supply of and the demand for teachers.  California’s class size reduction provides a vivid 
example of this phenomenon.  When California dropped early elementary class size from 30 to 
20 students, all elementary schools faced an increased demand for teachers.  However, because 
high-performing schools are generally more attractive to teachers, these schools were able to pull 
teachers from lower-performing schools.  Thus, low-performing schools needed more new 
teachers, not only because of the decreased class size but because many of their teachers left to 
move to other schools. This reform created a highly visible problem for difficult-to-staff schools; 
yet, less dramatic increases in the demand for teachers or decreases in the supply for teachers are 
likely to create similar disparities between high- and low-performing schools.  Supply and 
demand changes magnify in low-performing schools.  Thus, any change that might have been 
occurring in North Carolina concurrent with the reform could easily impact low-performing 
schools more than high-performing schools.  We see that the probability of leaving other schools 
increased over the time period, although not as much as in low-performing schools.  This 
magnification of the change in low-performing schools could be the result of any policy or 
 10 
economic force that influences the supply or demand of teachers, and not just policies that 
specifically target low-performing schools. 
 
Summary of Literature Review   
The two studies of the effects of state-led accountability reforms provide somewhat 
contradictory results.   The New York study analyzes the effects of the introduction of  
moderate-stakes tests to grade four.  It finds no evidence that an increased emphasis on test 
performance increases turnover or makes classes more difficult to staff.  On the other hand, the 
North Carolina study looks at the effects of a higher-stakes accountability system and finds 
higher turnover in low-performing, high-poverty schools post reform, though it is unable to show 
conclusively that the difference is the result of reforms.  More then identifying the likely effects 
of NCLB on teacher turnover, these studies show that the effects are not necessarily negative; the 
reforms may affect different teachers and different schools differently; and the details of the 
reforms and the related incentives they create are important to understand.  Thus, because NCLB 
allows substantial variability across states in how it is implemented, including the tests and the 
definitions of subgroups for examples, and states vary in characteristics of schools and the policy 
context in which the reforms were implemented, the effects of NCLB may be quite different in 
different places. 
 
3. Empirical Methods and Data for New Empirical Research 
The two studies reviewed so far each look at only one state.  Yet, across most states, the 
1990’s saw a variety of state-level reforms aimed to hold teachers and schools more accountable 
for the performance of their students.  These initiatives often included new tests, consequences 
for underperformance, and rewards for achievement.  As discussed above, the effects of these 
reforms on teachers’ career decisions are, a priori, ambiguous. This report now addresses three 
issues related to teacher turnover across states in the 1990s: (1) whether teachers left their jobs or 
plan to leave in the future (voluntary teacher turnover) due to reforms, (2) whether reforms 
 11 
allowed schools to fire ineffective teachers (school-initiated teacher turnover), and (3) whether 
new teachers are different than they would have been without reform. 4 
This cross-state analysis is constrained by the availability of national data.  Yearly 
surveys of turnover, spanning the reform years, would be ideal; however, the only nationwide 
survey of teachers and turnover rates is the US Department of Education’s Schools and Staffing 
Surveys (SASS) – a nationally representative, random surveys of U.S. districts, schools, and 
teachers – and its companion, the Teacher Follow-Up Survey (TFS).   There have been five 
waves of the SASS to date, in 1987-88, 1990-91, 1993-94, 1999-00, and 2003-04.  In the year 
following each wave, sampled schools were re-contacted to determine whether SASS-surveyed 
teachers had moved to a different school or left the teaching profession.  A random sample of 
these “movers”, “leavers”, and “stayers” were administered the TFS.  Unfortunately, data from 
the survey most relevant for analyzing NCLB, the 2003-04 TFS, is not yet available. 
Voluntary Teacher Turnover Analysis — While there are many reasons a teacher may 
leave the profession or change schools, for the purpose of this report it is important to isolate 
how much of the observed turnover is attributable to recent school reforms.  Two approaches aim 
at this goal.  First, the 1999-00 wave of the Teacher Follow-up Survey both identifies which 
teachers quit their jobs and specifically asks them why they quit their job.  This data allows the 
separation of reform-influenced turnover from other types of turnover and gives us a plausible 
upper bound on the size of the effect.  It shows that the overall influence of new reforms on 
turnover after 1999-00 is relatively small, on the order of 1-3% per year, and comparable to 
traditional reasons such as retirement or changing one’s residence.  Although the influence of 
reform is small, certain subgroups of teachers, such as new teachers and those in urban schools, 
appear to have been affected by reforms differentially.  However, these differentials work in 
predictable ways.   
The second approach asks whether changes over time in turnover patterns are different 
for states that implemented reforms of different strength.  If, for example, states which 
implemented strong reforms saw different changes in turnover patterns than weak-reform states, 
this might be an indication that reforms were responsible for this differential turnover pattern.  
                                                 
4 As noted earlier, data is not yet available to analyze directly the effects of NCLB.  But, the mechanisms included in 
the NCLB act are similar to those previously implemented by many states and conclusions drawn from these 
empirical exercises can help us predict the likely affects of NCLB.   
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This analysis combines raw turnover data5 from two waves of the TFS, from 1993-94 and 1999-
00, and exploits the facts that 1) there were few state-level school accountability systems in 
1993-94 (Texas, Florida, North Carolina, and South Carolina are exceptions to this), and 2) 
between this period there was large variation in the strength and degree of new state-initiated 
accountability reforms.  This variation was quantified in a one to five scale by Martin Carnoy 
and Susanna Loeb in their 2003 study of the effects of accountability reforms on student 
outcomes, and is utilized here.  Appendix A discusses and displays, by state, this index and the 
relevant policy mechanisms that define it. The analysis identifies the independent effect of 
accountability on turnover by looking at how reforms are correlated with changes in turnover 
patterns, rather than using self-reported data as in the first approach.  
The observed reform-influenced turnover studied above is not the whole story, however, 
as it may take time for teachers to react to reforms.  A third analysis below utilizes data on 
teachers’ future labor plans and ask whether reforms of varying strength have differentially 
affected teachers’ plans to remain in teaching.  Fortunately, the data is available from the 2003-
04 SASS, as well as from 1993-94 and 1999-00.  The data allows the measurement of early 
impacts of NCLB and the comparison to state-level reforms in the period leading up to national 
accountability implementation.   
School Initiated Teacher Turnover Analysis – The new analyses next explore whether 
reforms have helped schools to identify and dismiss ineffective teachers.  Standardized 
assessment and school report cards may help and encourage administrators to identify ineffective 
teachers; and increased emphasis on equitable growth in student achievement may provide 
schools with greater incentives and greater power to dismiss the lowest quality teachers.  The 
available data, however, is self-reported by the teacher and may be only a weak measure of 
dismissals attributable to ineffective teaching –caution in interpretation is therefore warranted.   
New Entrants to Teaching Analysis  – This section of the analysis asks whether 
accountability reforms have influenced what types of people choose to enter the teaching 
profession.  Have reforms deterred the best and brightest from becoming new teachers?  Or are 
reforms attracting young professionals to the teaching career because they now feel their efforts 
will be acknowledged and appreciated?  To shed some light on these questions, the analysis 
looks at average changes in the competitiveness of a new teachers’ undergraduate institution 
                                                 
5 Note, this exercise uses all teacher turnovers, not just reform-influenced turnovers as the above analysis.   
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between the 1993-94, 1999-00, and 2003-04 waves of the SASS.  While more competitive 
colleges may or may not provide better training for potential teachers, attendance at one is 
certainly, on average, a signal of a high innate ability.  If the average college quality of new 
teachers has changed differentially in states with different strength accountability reforms, it may 
be plausible to attribute these changes to reforms rather than other contemporaneous factors.  
Our measure of the competitiveness of an undergraduate institution comes from the Barron’s 
ratings of higher education institutions.   
A word of caution is required for all of the above analyses.  State-level accountability 
systems nationwide were not randomly implemented.  That is, districts and states adopted 
systems to suit their specific populations of students and staff and their particular policy 
environments.  Therefore, the relationships observed may be specific to those policy 
environments and not generalizable to other areas.   
 
4. Discussion and Results 
1. Voluntary Teacher Turnover  
Self-reported, reform-influenced teacher turnover – In the 2000-01 TFS, both teachers that left 
the profession (“leavers”) and teachers that moved to a different school (“movers”) were 
presented with a list of possible reasons for quitting and were asked to rate each reasons level of 
importance in the decision to quit on a 5-level “not at all important” to “extremely important” 
scale.  Movers and leavers, however, were given different sets of possible reasons, with little 
overlap.  Fortunately, two reasons asked of both groups related to “new reform measures” – they 
are “I do not agree with new reform measures” and “I did not feel prepared to implement new 
reform measures.”  While other reforms likely took place during this time period, standards and 
assessment-based accountability were the dominant reform in virtually every state in the nation.  
We believe it is reasonable to assume that teachers answered this question with accountability 
reforms, or reforms linked to this overall movement such as related professional development, in 
mind.  Other reasons for quitting presented to both movers and leavers include to retire, being 
laid-off, to find a job with better salary or benefits, to change residence, and being dissatisfied 
with changes in their job description or responsibilities.  We include these reasons in our analysis 
to gauge the relative magnitude of reform-induced turnover. 
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Turnover decisions tend to be influenced by many factors.  Reflecting this, most teachers 
reported multiple reasons as being “important” in their decision to leave their current job.  Given 
the questioning format, it is impossible to know whether or not accountability reforms were the 
most important reason why a teacher quit.  In what follows, we provide both liberal and 
conservative measures of reform-influenced turnover after the 1999-00 school year to get a sense 
of the range of possible effects. 
To put this analysis in the context of overall teacher turnover, we provide estimates of 
aggregate attrition rates for full-time, public school teachers after both the 1993-94 and 1999-
2000 academic years.6  Table 6 shows these results, along with the attrition rates for separate 
experience groups and urbanicity.  Overall attrition increased slightly between the two survey 
waves, while the fraction of movers and leavers remained roughly constant, at half each.  
Consistent with other studies, attrition rates are significantly higher for new teachers (Boyd, 
Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2005). 
The columns of Table 7 list three different estimators of the amount of influence various 
factors had on the quit decision of teachers.7  The first, and arguably most liberal, is the 
percentage of teachers that listed with any degree of importance new reforms as a reason for 
leaving.  We can see 2.54 percent of teachers left because to some degree they “did not agree 
with new reform measures”.  Likewise, 1.82 percent of teachers “did not feel prepared to 
implement the new reform measures.”  The third row shows that 3 percent of teachers either did 
not agree with or did not feel prepared to implement the new reforms.  This accounts for the fact 
that some teachers may have listed both measures as reasons for leaving.  The amount of reform-
influenced turnover is similar to turnover influenced by both changing residence and retiring, at 
4.15 percent and 2.6 percent respectively.  Furthermore, when compared with the overall attrition 
rate of 14.57 percent (Table 6), this very liberal estimator shows approximately 21 percent of 
teacher turnover was influenced in some degree by the new reforms. 
Some teachers may have been ready to leave their job regardless of the new reforms, for 
example to retire or raise kids.  For these teachers, accountability reforms might have been 
“slightly” or “somewhat” important in the decision to leave, yet not have enough of an impact to 
                                                 
6 All other analyses are similarly restricted to full-time, public school teachers. 
7 To focus on voluntary turnover, as opposed to school-initiated turnover, we exclude from this analysis teachers 
who indicated that "I was laid off or involuntary transferred" was "very" or "extremely" important in the decision to 
quit, about one percent of all teachers.  School initiated turnover patterns are discussed below in more detail. 
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induce quitting by itself.  We therefore look at a more conservative measure – the percentage of 
teachers that listed reform measures as being “very” or “extremely” important in the decision to 
leave – to get a better sense of the independent influence accountability reforms had on teacher 
turnover.  This measure is listed in column 2 of Table 7.  One trend is immediately apparent.  
While the differences between columns 1 and 2 are small for reasons that will likely induce 
turnover on their own, such as retirement or being laid off, the percentages fell by half for 
accountability related reasons.  This supports the hypothesis that accountability is only one factor 
among many that, when combined, induce a teacher to quit her job.  Using this more 
conservative measure, the share of overall turnover influenced by accountability reforms fall 
from about 21 percent to approximately 9 percent. 
However, since teachers can list more than one reason for leaving, neither of the above 
measures captures fully the independent effect of accountability on turnover.  For example, 
suppose both “changed my residence” and “dissatisfied with new reform measures” were 
important factors for leaving.  We don’t know if one reason by itself would have been sufficient 
to induce leaving if the other was not present.  We therefore create one last measure of the 
amount of turnover due to various reasons – whether the reason listed was given the highest level 
of importance out of all reasons.  If another reason for leaving was given a higher ranking than a 
reform-related reason, it is an indication that the teacher might have left anyway for that highest-
ranked reason, independent of the influence of new reforms.  These estimates listed in column 3 
of Table 7 are, not surprisingly, smaller yet quite similar to those in column 2. 
Multivariate regressions allows us to explore whether there are significant differentials in 
reform-influenced turnover across different types of teachers.  We estimate logit models of the 
probability that a teacher quits due to accountability reforms, conditional on personal, school, 
and state characteristics.  For simplicity, we only count a quit as reform-influenced if the teacher 
listed reforms as being “very” or “extremely” important in the decision to leave (that is, the 
estimates from column 2 of Table 7).  Table 8 displays these results.  Looking first at column 1, 
we can see that the most experienced teachers, compared to less experienced teachers, were more 
likely to quit because they did not agree with new reforms, consistent with the findings of Boyd, 
Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2006) from New York State.  New teachers, however, were more 
likely to quit because they feel unprepared to implement new reforms.  Quitting because of 
disagreement with new reforms was the strongest for urban teachers and those in schools with 
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high minority concentrations.  This may be because reforms changed the work environment the 
most in these schools. 
Tables 9 and 10 estimate the above logit models by teacher sub-population.  Interestingly, 
reform-influenced turnover is correlated with the strength of those reforms only for certain 
subsets of teachers.  It appears accountability strength had a positive influence on new teachers; 
the probability they quit is smaller in strong reform states.  This is consistent with the view that 
new teachers benefit from the structure imposed by reforms.  However, the effect was opposite 
for suburban teachers; they were more likely to quit in strong accountability states.  This result is 
consistent with the findings of Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2006) from New York 
State, however, it must be kept in mind that overall, urban teachers are still more likely to quit 
due to reforms than are suburban teachers.8 
While this analysis is informative, it has a number of limitations.  For one, the reasons 
presented to quitters concerned the importance of “new” reform measures in the decision to quit.  
Therefore, the timing of accountability reforms matters.  If a teacher was hired while the new 
accountability system was already in place, there would have been no “new” reforms to speak of 
and the responses will underestimate the impacts of reforms on turnover.  Another limitation is 
that we only have data from the 1999-00 school year.  Given that different states were in 
different stages of the reform process, these estimates only capture some of the reform-
influenced turnover.  That is, teachers may have already left, or will leave in the future due to 
reforms. 
To summarize, self-reported data on teacher turnover from the 2000-01 TFS shows us 
that (1) compared to other reasons for leaving, accountability reforms have a relatively small 
influence on turnover and (2) reforms influenced the turnover of different types of teachers to 
different degrees and in different ways.  Next, we pursue a different empirical strategy to answer 
the same question; we now look at aggregate turnover patterns pre- and post-reform, and see if 
changes are correlated with the strength of accountability reforms introduced. 
 
                                                 
8 In analyses not presented, we include the competitiveness of a teachers’ college as a control and find there was no 
significant differential in terms of the probability of quitting due to reforms for the population as a whole as well as 
various subgroups.  To the extent that college quality predicts the quality of a teacher, this is evidence, however 
slight, that the “best” teachers are not more likely to quit due to reforms.  
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Voluntary teacher turnover, Difference in difference study – We use the two available 
waves of the TFS, from 1993-94 and 1999-00, to estimate a difference in difference logit model 
predicting the probability of teacher attrition.  We control for teacher and school characteristics, 
by survey wave, and look for differentials in teacher turnover across accountability system 
strength.  Table 11 displays the odds ratios for an interaction term between the 1999-00 wave 
and accountability strength, for the full sample, and for selected sub samples of teachers.  We 
can see that only for suburban teachers with little experience and those in mostly minority 
schools was there a significant effect of accountability strength.  DISCUSS MORE HERE   
 
Teachers’ Future Career Plans – Next we ask whether accountability reforms have 
influenced teachers’ future plans to leave teaching.  We again use a difference in difference 
approach, looking at how changes between survey waves in plans to quit correlate with 
accountability strength.  As this exercise uses data from the SASS, rather than the TFS, we 
include the most recent wave, from 2004, along with the 1993 and 1999 eaves, and can observe 
the influence of the early years of the NCLB act.  The independent variable in this logit analysis 
is an indicator created from the survey question “How long do you plan to remain in teaching?”  
This indicator variable equals one if a teacher indicated any degree of wanting to leave teaching.9  
An interaction between accountability strength and the 1999 SASS wave dummies estimates 
whether teachers in high accountability states were relatively more likely to want to leave the 
teaching profession post reform.  As the NCLB act tended to unify accountability systems across 
stats, an interaction between the 2003 SASS wave dummy and the accountability index tells us 
the inverse of the 1999 interaction term.  That is, a higher accountability index means that state 
underwent less reform than a low index state. 
The results presented in Table 12 show that neither of these differential exist for the 
teacher population as a whole.  When we allow the effect to vary across subpopulations of 
teachers, two differentials are significant.  First, new suburban teachers are less likely to want to 
leave teaching in 1999 in higher reform states.  Second, for suburban teachers with 7-10 years of 
experience, those in states that underwent more reform between 1999 and 2003 were more likely 
to want to leave in 2003.  While these results are contradictory, the overall effect appears to be 
                                                 
9 Independent variable equals one if the teacher responded she “Will probably continue unless something better 
comes along” or she “Definitely plans to leave teaching as soon as I can.”  It takes the value zero if she responded 
“As long as I am able,” “Until I am eligible for retirement,” or “Undecided at this time.” 
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that accountability reforms, both pre- and post-NCLB, had little influence on teachers’ future 
career plans. 
 
2.  School-initiated teacher turnover – Thus far, we have focused on how accountability 
reforms have affected the supply of teachers.  Reforms, however, may also affect the types of 
teachers demanded by schools.  We use the self-reported data on reasons for leaving from the 
TFS to identify teachers who indicated that their departure from the school was not voluntary. 10  
Fortunately, involuntary turnover was offered as a reason in both the 1993-94 and 1999-00 
waves of the survey, so a difference in difference analysis is again possible.  We would like to 
know whether the proportion of teachers that leave involuntarily varies with the accountability 
system strength, and to test this, we estimate a logit model of the probability a teacher’s job was 
terminated by the school.  As before, an interaction term between the 1999-00 survey wave and 
accountability strength captures the desired differential.  Two caveats, however, are in order.  
First, school-initiated turnover levels are very small – significantly less than 1% of teachers per 
year.  Second, this data is self-reported by teachers, whose reasons for leaving may or may not 
agree with what their school would say was the reason for leaving.   
Table 13 summarizes this analysis.  Odds ratios for two variables – the 1999 wave 
dummy and this dummy interacted with accountability strength – are shown, for models run on 
the full population of teachers, and for various subgroups.11    First, note that overall there is a 
much greater probability – a 4.74% greater probability – of being fired in 2000-01 than in 1993-
94, and this trend is apparent in almost all sub-groups.  While we recognize that differential 
wording of the questions between waves may be responsible for this disparity, it is striking, and 
may be reflecting the greater ability of administrators to fire teachers post-reform.  This view is 
strengthened by the odds ratios from column 2, which show that certain subgroups of teachers 
                                                 
10 A potential problem exists in that the questions asked in the two TFS waves were not worded the same, or 
measured in the same scale.  In the 1994-95 wave, teachers were allowed to indicate up to three reasons for their 
turnover, with no indication of relative importance; one of these was “School staffing action (e.g., reduction-in-
force, lay-off, school-closing, school reorganization, reassignment).”  In the 2000-01 wave we only know if “I was 
laid off or involuntary transferred” was of some degree of importance in a turnover.  To make these waves 
comparable, we label a turnover as school-initiated if: (1) “school staffing action” was listed at all in the 1994-95 
wave, and (2) being laid-off or transferred was “very” or “extremely” important in the turnover decision in the 2000-
01 wave. 
11 Also included in the regressions are gender, race/ethnicity, experience, whether or not a teacher teaches 
elementary school, the competitiveness of the teachers’ undergraduate institution, log of salary, the percent of black 
or Hispanic students in the school, and whether the school is urban or suburban. 
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were affected differentially by reforms of different strength.  For example, among teachers with 
3-6 year of experience, a one unit increase in accountability strength was associated, on average, 
with being 3.1 times more likely to leave their job involuntarily.  The positive association also 
holds for new suburban teachers, but there is a negative association among schools with the most 
minorities. 
 
3. Effect of Accountability Reforms on New Teachers – Finally, we ask whether 
accountability reforms have influenced the types of colleges new teachers attended.  With pooled 
observations from the 1993-94, 1999-2000, and 2003-04 SASS waves, we estimate ordered logit 
models predicting the five-level competitiveness of a teacher’s undergraduate institution.  
Interactions between accountability strength and SASS wave dummies let us see if variation in 
accountability strength is associated with changes in college competitiveness for new teachers 
post-reform.  The interaction between the index and the 2003 wave dummy can be interpreted as 
explained the Teachers’ Future Career Plans section above. Again, we estimate this model for 
new teachers overall, as well as for various sub-samples of new teachers. 
The first two columns of Table 14 shows that, on average, competitiveness of new 
teacher’s colleges decreased monotonically from 1993 to 2003.  Furthermore, the decrease in 
average competitiveness was greater in states with stronger accountability reforms in 1999.  This 
decrease, however, was driven mostly by new teachers in urban schools and new elementary 
school teachers.  Between 1993 and 2003, there appears to be no significant variation in changes 
in college competitiveness of new teachers  
 
5. Summary of Teacher Section 
How have teachers responded to assessment-based accountability?  The research on this 
is not deep.  There is evidence from New York State that when tests are implemented in some 
grades but not others, teachers do not disproportionately leave tested grades.  In fact, perhaps due 
to increased attention to those grades, turnover rates are lower and new teachers are more 
qualified than in the comparison grades.  However, what happens when accountability and 
testing is implemented throughout the system?  The results are less clear.  A study from North 
Carolina suggests that teachers avoid low achieving schools when those schools are branded 
“low achieving” or when there are monetary incentives to work in higher achieving schools.  
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National, self-reported data on teachers suggests that accountability reforms have not led to 
substantially increased turnover of teachers.  Approximately 14.6 percent of teachers transferred 
across schools or left teaching between the 1999-2000 and 2000-’01 academic year.  Only one 
percent of teachers indicated that disagreement with reform measures was very or extremely 
important in their decision to leave, and this rate was no higher in states with strong 
accountability policies than in states with weaker policy.   
****Update below after doing new analyses*** 
In fact, for new teachers (those with less than three years of experience), reform-driven 
attrition was lower in states with stronger accountability.  Similarly, when we look at teachers 
plans for the future, we see no relationship between plans to remain in teaching and the strength 
of the accountability system in their state.  Using a very weak proxy for teacher quality, the 
competitiveness of the teachers’ undergraduate institution, we find that the average 
competitiveness dropped relatively more in strong accountability states in the 1990s, especially 
in urban schools and in elementary schools.  We also found that the probability of being laid off 
increased during the 1990s, which may be the results of accountability but may be due to other 
changes as well. 
 
IV.  Principal Turnover 
1. Overview and Review of Literature 
Accountability reforms may have affected principals’ jobs to an even greater extent than 
they affected teaching.  The implications of these changes, however, are not clear a priori.  
Accountability reforms often include decentralization, moving from a top-down, district 
mandated approach to one in which principals have more control over curriculum, budgeting, 
hiring, firing, and classroom organization.  The idea behind this change is that greater flexibility 
at the school level will allow principals the flexibility to do what is necessary to improve student 
outcomes (Oberman 1996, Ladd and Zelli 2002).  Loeb and Strunk (2005), for example, show 
that in the 1999-00 school year principals indicated having more control over their schools the 
stronger the accountability system, and that this control had increased most in states that 
implemented stronger accountability policies.12   
                                                 
12 Accountability strength is again measured by the Carnoy-Loeb accountability index. 
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At the same time that principals gain control, they are held more accountable for the 
performance of their students, facing both possible dismissal for underperformance and 
recognition for success.  Many reforms have increased the transparency of school performance to 
the public through school report cards and other means.  Principals then may be forced to play a 
more political role, answering to the community, to teachers and to the district (Oberman 1996).  
Thus, reforms have given principals greater control to perform their job well, but at the cost of 
greater responsibilities and repercussions for not delivering high student growth.  Principals may 
not be happy with the increased pressure or responsibilities, but, research suggests that many 
principals also desire recognition of their work and control over the resources necessary to do 
their jobs (Oberman 1996).  Reforms, therefore, may be desirable to some principals and less 
desirable to others. 
Accountability systems may also have distributional effects.  Reforms may be more 
likely to induce principals to leave underachieving schools relative to other schools.  On the 
other hand, principals seeking to promote change may be drawn to those schools that have the 
most room for improvement if they now have the resources and flexibility they need to be 
effective.  Over time, accountability may lead to a better principal staff if good principals can be 
found to replace those who are either dismissed or leave due to dissatisfaction with reforms.   
In considering the effect of accountability on principals, we would like to be able to 
answer the following questions: (1) To what extent are principals voluntarily quitting their jobs 
due to reforms?  If so, who is leaving and which reform mechanisms are causing them to leave?  
(2) Have reforms allowed administrators to replace ineffective principals?  (3) Have the reforms 
changed the pool of prospective principals?  (4) How has reform-influenced turnover of 
principals affected student academic achievement?   
Unfortunately, empirical evidence on reform-influenced principal turnover is scarce and 
inconclusive – even thinner than the research on teachers.  Oberman (1996), for example, finds 
evidence that principal turnover rates in Chicago increased concurrent with reforms that included 
significant changes in the job of school principal.  However, the study does not adequately 
address which principals left, why they left, or whether this turnover was beneficial or harmful to 
reform goals.  Principal attrition is not necessarily bad for students, if the principals leaving are 
ineffective. One of the goals of reform may be to remove ineffective principals and replace them 
with more effective ones.  Unfortunately, there is evidence that many districts have been , and 
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are, having trouble finding and retaining qualified principal candidates, especially in the face of 
reforms. (Whitaker 2001; Winter and Morgenthal 2002). 
 
2. Empirical Evidence on Principal Dismissal due to Assessment and Accountability 
While there is no direct data available on reform-influenced, voluntary principal turnover, 
we present some estimates of the rates of involuntary principal dismissals.  Both the 1999-00 and 
the 2003-04 SASS district questionnaires ask whether any schools in the district “had the 
principal reassigned or released” in the last 12 months due to student achievement.13  As this 
question only applies to those districts that were subject to sanctions, we only include them in the 
analysis.14   
Table 15 estimates the percent of schools in a district that had at least one principal 
removed or replaced due to student performance.  Looking at differences between survey waves 
for similar groups, we can see a large significant drop in principal removal between 1999-00 and 
2003-04; nationwide, approximately 8.34 percent of districts had a principal removed in 1998-99 
while the comparable number is 0.54 percent in 2002-03.  Comparisons across groups, however, 
are not representative of actual differences in rates of principal removal, due to the fact that 
districts in different sub-groups have different numbers of schools.  Urban districts, for example, 
have more schools on average than rural districts.  Since we only have data on whether any 
school in the district had a principal replaced, districts with more schools will be more likely to 
answer the question affirmatively.  This fact is verified in the logit model presented in Table 16 
predicting the probability a district had a school in which the principal was fired due to student 
achievement.  Table 16 shows that, controlling for district size, there was no significant 
differential in firings across urbanicity in 1999, but there was in 2003.  Urban and suburban 
schools did not see as big a drop in firing as did rural schools.  Furthermore, inter-temporal 
comparisons may be confounded if the number of districts potentially subject to sanctions varied 
between survey waves.  However, in our sample, this number rose only two percentage points 
from 59 percent in 1998-99 to 61 percent in 2002-03.   
                                                 
13 The 1999-00 wave asked how many schools in the district had principals that were reassigned or released in the 
past 12 months due to student achievements, while the 2003-04 wave only asks if there were any such dismissals.  
We present only the former statistic for comparison purposes. 
14 Some districts within states differ on whether or not they are subject to state sanctions, while we would assume a 
priori that all districts within a state would agree.  This disagreement is greater in 2003 than in 1999, and it is 
unclear how this discrepancy might bias our results. 
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The patterns in Tables 15 and 16 indicate that under school-based assessment and 
accountability policies some principals were fired.  The drop in firing between 1999 and 2003 is 
difficult to explain. We do not have data on principal removal due to student achievement prior 
to reform, and, thus, do not know whether the 1999 numbers or the 2003 numbers are more 
similar to the steady state before accountability. 
In summary, we know very little about how accountability has affected the career 
decisions of principals.  In theory, accountability may be beneficial, particularly to effective 
principals.  We do not know whether this theory plays out in reality, or whether the increased 
responsibilities are too difficult even for potentially effective principals and lead to greater, 
detrimental turnover.  
 
V.  Summary 
Despite the likelihood that accountability reforms may have substantially changed the 
lives of teachers and principals, we have little strong empirical research to document changes in 
attrition as a result of these policies.  The research on teachers indicates that these policies may 
have led to some changes, but these changes have been small.  Research on principals is even 
thinner.  We do know that they react to accountability policies, changing their behavior in 
schools (Ladd and Zelli 2002).  However, we don’t know the extent to which such policies have 
induced turnover nor the differential effects on principals in different schools or of different 
effectiveness.   
One important caveat of these research results is that most are based on accountability 
policies prior to the implementation of the No Child Left Behind of 2001 (NCLB).  NCLB not 
only nationalized assessment-based accountability, but also included the Highly Qualified 
Teacher Provision which required that by 2006 all children be taught by a highly qualified 
teacher, defined as one who holds a baccalaureate degree, is fully state certified and 
demonstrates competency in the core academic subject or subjects they teach.  This requirement 
clearly has not been met and the deadline has been extended, but there is some evidence that the 
requirement has led to substantial changes in the teacher workforce, particularly the reduction of 
emergency certified (uncertified or temporary license) teachers.   
The difference between NCLB and prior state-led accountability reforms points to the 
importance of the details of the policies.  Accountability policies that reward teachers or 
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principals in higher performing schools may have different effects, particularly different 
distributional effects, than policies that do not.  Policies that include regulations or sanctions 
based on teacher or principal qualifications may have different effects than those that do not.  
Reforms that penetrate schools to the extent that assessment-based accountability has are likely 
to change the work lives in those schools and have repercussions on the related workforce.  We 
do not, as of yet, know whether these repercussions will be beneficial or detrimental to the 
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Table 1     
Logit Estimates of Teacher Leaving the 4
th
 Grade Relative to Other Grades by Urbanicity and Quartile of 
Student Test Performance: Odds Ratios (Z-stat) 
Source: Table 4 in Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2006)  
Variable All Urban Suburban Rural 
fourth grade x post 1998 0.91 0.89 0.92 0.91 
 (4.25) (3.64) (2.47) (1.69) 
N 359,962 148,390 149,769 61,803 
     
  Highest Quartile Quart 2 Quart 3 Lowest Quartile 
fourth grade x post 1998 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.88 
 (2.21) (1.74) (1.36) (3.32) 
N 89,938 89,026 90,061 90,937 
Note: Student test scores are on the 4th grade math exam.  The first quartile is the schools with the lowest proportion of these scores.  Models 
include teacher, student, and school controls.  See Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2006) for more details. 
 
Table 2       
Logit Estimates of Leaving the 4
th
 Grade for Teachers with Different Characteristics by Urbanicity and 
Student Performance Quartile: Odds Ratios (Z-Stats) 














All Schools       
characteristic * post 1998  * grade 4 0.75 1.147 1.273 1.382 0.877 1.032 
N= 359,962 (3.80) (1.61) (2.92) (3.46) (1.83) (0.41) 
Suburban Schools       
characteristic * post 1998  * grade 4 0.604 1.395 1.71 1.88 0.835 0.939 
N=149,769 (3.87) (2.27) (3.71) (3.90) (1.79) (0.33) 
Highest Test Quartile        
characteristic * post 1998  * grade 4 0.504 1.692 2.147 2.148 0.76 0.835 
N=89,938 (4.01) (2.75) (4.05) (3.65) (2.04) (0.68) 
       
Note: Student test scores are on the 4th grade math exam.  The first quartile is the schools with the lowest proportion of these scores.  Models 




Table 3       
Logit Estimates of Teacher Characteristics for New 4
th
 Grade for teachers by Urbanicity and 
Student Performance Quartile:  Odds Ratios (Z-Stats) 
Source: Table 5 in Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2006)  








All Schools       
post 1999  * grade 4 0.92 1.19 0.99 0.86 1.09 0.98 
 (2.06) (4.73) (0.26) (3.46) (1.57) (0.36) 
N 110,296 110,296 110.296 110,296 84,713 63,249 
              
Urban Schools       
post 1999  * grade 4 0.86 1.17 0.98 0.96 1.14 0.97 
 (2.75) (2.12) (0.26) (0.56) (1.37) (0.45) 
N 62,031 62,031 62,031 62,031 43,562 36,756 
Lowest Test 
Quartile 
      
post 1999  * grade 4 0.79 1.13 1.05 1.05 1.3 0.93 
 (3.66) (2.05) (0.88) (0.70) (2.50) (0.99) 
N 41,939 41,939 41,939 41,939 30,124 25,499 
Note: Student test scores are on the 4th grade math exam.  The first quartile is the schools with the lowest proportion of these 
scores.  Models include teacher, student, and school controls.  See Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2006) for more details. 
 







Table 6             
Aggregate teacher turnover of full-time, public school teachers after the 1993-94 and 1999-00 school years, 
by attrition type, experience level, and poverty concentration 
             




Movers  Leavers  
Movers and 
Leavers 
Movers  Leavers 
Percent attrition  12.69 6.42 6.27  14.57 7.39 7.17 
(standard error)  (0.53) (0.35) (0.36)  (0.59) (0.48) (0.40) 
             
# observations  3,587 3,587 3,587  3,666 3,666 3,666 
             
  
Movers and Leavers  Movers and Leavers 
  Experience Level (years)  Experience Level (years) 
  All 0 to 2 3 to 6 
7 to 
10 11+  All 0 to 2 3 to 6 
7 to 
10 11+ 
             
Percent attrition  12.69 21.02 17.38 13.51 10.37  14.57 22.24 18.59 14.27 11.88 
(standard error)  (0.53) (1.71) (1.68) (1.76) (0.64)  (0.59) (1.96) (1.43) (1.55) (0.77) 
             
# observations  3,587 722 683 341 1791  3,666 7,63 7,69 3,97 1,737 
             
  
Movers and Leavers  Movers and Leavers 
  Urbanicity  Urbanicity 
  Urban Suburban Rural  Urban Suburban Rural 
             
Percent attrition  14.29 12.09 12.12  14.58 14.95 13.72 
(standard error)  (1.29) (1.01) (0.65)  (1.32) (0.94) (0.95) 
             
# observations  845 957 1785  833 1588 1195 
             
  
  





Table 7    
Percentage of teachers whose quit decision was influenced by the following 
reasons. 3 measures of the degree of importance in the decision to leave. 
    
 Degree of importance in the decision to leave 
 1 2 3 
 





Greatest level of 
importance among 
all reasons 
Reason for leaving    
I do not agree with new 
reform measures. 2.54 1.03 0.73 
 (0.21) (0.14) (0.12) 
I did not feel prepared to 
implement new reform 
measures. 1.82 0.52 0.38 
 (0.20) (0.09) (0.08) 
I do not agree with new 
reform measures. OR I did 
not feel prepared to 
implement new reform 
measures. 3.00 1.25 0.86 
 (0.25) (0.15) (0.13) 
I was dissatisfied with 
changes in my job 
description or 
responsibilities. 3.88 1.90 1.29 
 (0.30) (0.25) (0.20) 
For better salary or benefits.* 3.00 2.48 2.26 
 (0.30) (0.29) (0.28) 
I changed my residence. 4.15 2.61 2.28 
 (0.28) (0.25) (0.26) 
To retire. 2.60 2.18 2.14 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) 
    
Note: Includes both movers and leavers. Data is from the nationally representative 2000-2001 Teacher Followup 
Survey to the 1999-2000 Schools and Staffing Survey, with 3,666 observations.  Observations are not counted in 
the above percentages if a teacher indicated that "I was laid off or involuntary transferred" was "very" or 
"extremely" important in the decision to quit. The degrees of importance provided were "not at all", "slightly", 
"somewhat", "very", or "extremely" important. Standard errors in parentheses. *The reason provided to movers 




Table 8    
Logit models predicting the probability of quitting, for different subsets of quitters 
Odds ratios, z-stats in parentheses  
  
Independent variable = 1 if the following reason was "very" or "extremely" 
important in the decision to quit. 
  1 2 
  
I do not agree with new reform 
measures. 
I did not feel prepared to implement new 
reform measures. 
Male  2.05 1.25 
  (2.43)* (0.56) 
Black or Hispanic  1.08 0.93 
  (0.14) (0.16) 
Log Income  0.3 1 
  (2.52)* 0.00  
0-2 years experience  0.31 3.75 
  (1.92) (2.51)* 
3-6 years experience  0.83 2.17 
  (0.79) (1.81) 
7-10 years experience  0.18 0.52 
  (4.04)** (1.10) 
Mid-career entrant  1.36 2.31 
  (0.48) (1.11) 
Teaches math or 
science  0.62 0.88 
  (1.23) (0.21) 
Has masters  1.22 1.03 
  (0.60) (0.09) 
Quartile of % blk or his 
students    
2nd quartile  0.87 1.17 
  (0.35) (0.30) 
3rd quartile  2.25 0.83 
  (2.00)* (0.38) 
4th quartile  1.58 1.67 
  (1.38) (1.28) 
Elementary school  0.86 0.75 
  (0.54) (0.72) 
Suburban   0.51 0.57 
  (2.18)* (1.26) 
Rural  0.34 0.52 
  (2.49)* (1.34) 
C-L Accountability Index  1.12 0.99 
  (1.07) (0.09) 
Sample Size  3659 3659 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11       
Logit models of whether a teacher quit. 
Sample Split by sub-populations of teachers.  
Only odds ratio of (accountability index)*(1999 survey) interaction displayed.  
       
   Odds Ratio on variable   
Sub-Sample     
Acc. 
Index*1999-00 
wave (z-stat)   # obsns 
       
All teachers   0.93 (1.25)  7241 
       
Urban All  0.9 (0.99)  1716 
 0-2 yrs exper  1.02 (0.09)  349 
 3-6 yrs exper  1.35 (1.64)  316 
 7-10 yrs exper  0.67 (1.42)  171 
 11 + yrs exper  0.87 (0.92)  880 
       
Suburban All  0.98 (0.18)  2545 
 0-2 yrs exper  1.49 (2.04)*  510 
 3-6 yrs exper  0.7 (2.23)*  539 
 7-10 yrs exper  0.72 (1.21)  272 
 11 + yrs exper  1.07 (0.74)  1224 
       
Rural All  0.94 (0.74)  2980 
 0-2 yrs exper  0.92 (0.35)  673 
 3-6 yrs exper  0.89 (0.54)  596 
 7-10 yrs exper  0.73 (0.87)  294 
 11 + yrs exper  1.08 (0.63)  1417 
       
All 
Urbanicity 0-2 yrs exper  0.99 (0.05)  1532 
 3-6 yrs exper  0.87 (0.98)  1451 
 7-10 yrs exper  0.78 (1.11)  737 
 11 + yrs exper  0.99 (0.14)  3521 
       
Elementary School Teacher  0.92 (0.92)  3023 
Secondary School Teacher  0.96 (0.63)  4218 
       
1st  1.14 (1.11)  1615 
2nd  0.94 (0.62)  1732 
Quartile of % 
Blk or 
Hispanic 
Students 3rd  1.13 (1.32)  1823 
  4th   0.79 (2.08)*   1784 
Note: Independent variable = 1 if a teacher changed schools or left teaching.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 




Table 12.  Logit models of whether a teacher has any desire to leave teaching in the future.  
Sample Split by sub-populations of teachers. Selected odds ratios displayed.  
   Odds Ratio on variable   
   1   2   








stat)   
# 
obsns 
          
All teachers   1.02 (0.61)  0.98 (0.57)  104175 
          
Urban All  1.06 (1.05)  1.03 (0.57)  23948 
 0-2 yrs exper  1.16 (1.09)  1.07 (0.57)  2446 
 3-6 yrs exper  1.03 (0.37)  0.87 (1.29)  4177 
 
7-10 yrs 
exper  1.01 (0.07)  1.11 (1.56)  3268 
 
11 + yrs 
exper  1.04 (0.66)  1.05 (0.92)  14057 
          
Suburban All  0.97 (0.74)  0.92 (1.84)  37242 
 0-2 yrs exper  0.72 (3.63)**  0.86 (1.31)  3641 
 3-6 yrs exper  1.07 (0.64)  0.92 (0.87)  6862 
 
7-10 yrs 
exper  0.97 (0.40)  0.79 (2.68)**  5298 
 
11 + yrs 
exper  0.94 (1.04)  0.98 (0.25)  21441 
          
Rural All  1.00 (0.11)  0.99 (0.22)  42985 
 0-2 yrs exper  1.06 (0.71)  0.88 (1.60)  3846 
 3-6 yrs exper  0.94 (0.82)  1.01 (0.16)  7221 
 
7-10 yrs 
exper  1.02 (0.26)  0.98 (0.21)  5822 
 
11 + yrs 
exper  1.02 (0.36)  0.99 (0.19)  26096 
          
All Urbanicity 0-2 yrs exper  1.00 (0.06)  1.05 (0.65)  9933 
 3-6 yrs exper  1.04 (0.73)  0.93 (1.08)  18260 
 
7-10 yrs 
exper  1.03 (0.43)  0.96 (0.88)  14388 
 
11 + yrs 
exper  0.99 (0.45)  1 (0.05)  61594 
          
Elementary School Teacher  1.02 (0.47)  0.94 (1.78)  38728 
Secondary School Teacher  1.00 (0.02)  1.03 (0.50)  65447 
          
1st  1.09 (1.67)  0.93 (1.66)  26357 
2nd  0.94 (1.24)  0.99 (0.09)  26549 
Quartile of % Blk 
or Hispanic 
Students 3rd  1.06 (1.22)  0.97 (0.62)  26163 
  4th   1.02 (0.34)   1.02 (0.50)   25106 
* Independent variable equals one if teacher responded to the question "How long will do you plan to remain in teaching?" with "Will probably 
continue until something better comes along" or "Definately plan to leave teaching as soon as I can."  It takes the value zero if she responded 
“As long as I am able,” “Until I am eligible for retirement,” or “Undecided at this time.”  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   Source: SASS 




Table 13          
Logits by sub-population predicting the probability of being laid off or involuntarily transferred. 
Selected odds ratios displayed.        
   Odds Ratio on variable   
   1   2   




stat)   
Acc. 
Index*1999-00 
wave (z-stat)   # obsns 
          
All teachers   4.74 (2.44)*  0.78 (1.22)  7241 
          
Urban All  12.87 (1.81)  0.55 (1.50)  1716 
 
0-2 yrs 
exper  9.15 (0.97)  0.63 (0.82)  323 
 
3-6 yrs 
exper  44.09 (1.81)  2.22 (1.71)  226 
          
Suburban All  8.83 (1.78)  0.61 (1.13)  2545 
 
0-2 yrs 
exper  0.33 (0.98)  7.25 (2.62)**  510 
 
3-6 yrs 
exper  4.46 (0.93)  1.84 (0.86)  539 
          
Rural All  0.98 (0.02)  1.64 (2.24)*  2980 
 
0-2 yrs 
exper  6.16 (2.31)*  0.84 (0.81)  673 
 
3-6 yrs 
exper  0.07 (1.29)  5.99 (2.25)*  574 




exper  7.76 (1.65)  0.66 (1.14)  1532 
 
3-6 yrs 
exper  0.59 (0.38)  3.1 (2.44)*  1451 
          
Elementary School 
Teacher  8.72 (2.22)*  0.71 (0.91)  1417 
Secondary School 
Teacher  1.84 (0.79)  0.88 (0.50)  3023 
          
1st  1.01 (0.01)  1.29 (0.64)  1592 
2nd  0.64 (0.53)  1.85 (1.93)  1732 
Quartile of 
% Blk or 
Hispanic 
Students 3rd  5.95 (2.34)*  0.96 (0.21)  1823 
  4th   66.9 (2.19)*   0.38 (1.97)*   1784 
Notes: Independent variable is whether a teacher self-reported being laid off or involuntarily transferred as a reason for leaving. 
Teacher and school characteristics are also included in the regressions.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Source: 1994-95 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 15: Estimated percent of schools in a district that had at least one principal 
removed or replaced due to student performance  
            
      Urbanicity of the District   
Quartile of %Black or Hispanic  
Students in the District 
    
All 
Districts   Urban Suburban Rural   1 2 3 4 
            
 8.39  13.66 7.78 8.15  6.78 6.24 7.02 13.73 
1999-00 wave  (0.61)  (2.00) (0.80) (0.94)  (1.91) (0.89) (1.13) (1.11) 
            
            
 0.54  2.96 0.52 0.04  0.05 0.00 0.54 1.7 
2003-04 wave   (0.13)   (0.37) (0.27) (0.002)   (0.01) (0.00) (0.46) (0.32) 
            
s.e. in parentheses          





Table 16:  Logit predicting if any school in the district had a principal reassigned or removed 
due to sanctions.  Odds Ratios 
 
 
  Odds Ratio 
Variable (s.e.) 
# schools in the district 1.01 
 (8.31)** 






urban * yr03 35.08 
 (15.84)** 
suburban * yr03 13.45 
 (4.64)** 
% blk or his students 3.07 




t statistics in parentheses 




Appendix A:  Accountability Index, by State, 1999-2000 
This zero-to-five scale captures the degree of state external pressure on schools to improve 
student achievement according to state-defined performance criteria.  States receiving a zero did 
not test students statewide or did not set any statewide standards for schools or districts.  States 
that required state testing in the elementary and middle grades and the reporting of test results to 
the state but no school or district sanctions or rewards receive a one.  Those states that tested at 
the elementary and middle school levels and had moderate school or district accountability 
sanctions/rewards or, alternatively, a high school exit test receive a two.  Those states that tested 
at the lower and middle grades, had moderate accountability repercussions for schools and 
districts, and required an exit test in high school, receive a three.  Those that tested and placed 
strong pressure on schools or districts to improve student achievement (threat of reconstitution, 
principal transfer, loss of students) but did not require a high school exit test receive a four.  
States receiving a five tested students in primary and middle grades, strongly sanctioned and 
rewarded schools or districts based on improvement in student test scores, and required a high 
school minimum competency exit test for graduation.  As examples, states such as Iowa and 
Nebraska, which did not have any state-level accountability requirements for schools or districts, 
are coded zero; and states with “maximum” state level demands on schools and that required a 
high school competency exam for graduation, such as Texas, North Carolina, New Jersey, and 




































Strong Yes 10 2001 4 
Alaska 4-7 None None None Yes 10 2002 1 
Arizona 3,5,8,10 Report cards ‘Public shame’ Weak Yes 10 2002 2 
Arkansas 4, 6 None None None No   1 
California 2-11 Report cards Ratings, awards, 
intervention 
Strong No 10 2004 4 (2)* 
Colorado 3, literacy None None None No   1 




Weak No   1 
Delaware 3,5,8,10,11 None None None No 10 2004 1 
Florida 4,5,8,10 Report cards Ratings, subject 
to vouchers 
Strong Yes 10 1988 5 
Georgia 3,4,5,8,11 School reports None None Yes 11 1995 2 
Hawaii 3,5,8,10 None None None No   1 
Idaho ITBS, 3-8 None None None No   1 





Moderate No   2.5 
Indiana 3,6,8,10 Performance 
Assessment 
Accreditation Moderate Yes 10 1999 3 
Iowa None None None None No   0 













Louisiana LEAP,4,8 Report cards, 
growth targets 
Intervention Moderate Yes 10 1991 3 
Maine 4,8,11 None None None No   1 








2001 4 (5) 
Massachusetts 4,8,10 Students only Student 
promotions 
Implicit only Yes 10 2003 2  
Michigan 4,5,7,8 School rating Accreditation Weak No   1 
Minnesota 3,5,8,10 School reports None None Yes 8,10  2 
Mississippi 2-8 Only districts 
accountable, 








Yes 11 1994 3 




Possible audit Weak No   1.5  
Montana 4,8,11 None None None No   1 
Nebraska None None None None No   0 
Nevada 4,8,10 School reports None Weak Yes 11 1999 1.5 
New 
Hampshire 
3,6,10 None None None No   1 
New Jersey 4,5,11 Mostly district 




Strong Yes 11  5 








Yes 10 1990 4 (5) 
New York 4,5,8,11 State review of 
school 
performance 
Freeze on pupil 
registration 
Strong Yes 10  1998 5 (2) 
North 
Carolina 
3-8 School ratings Money rewards, 
intervention 
Strong Yes 9 1994 5 
North Dakota 4,8,12 Improve student 
learning 
Accreditation Weak No   1 







Moderate Yes 9  3 
Oklahoma 5,8 Reports to state Accreditation Weak No   1 








Yes  10 1991 2.5 
Pennsylvania 5,6,8,9,11 High schools 
have ratings 
Money for HS 
improvement 
Weak No   1 
Rhode Island 3,4,7,8,10 Yearly progress 




No   1 
South 
Carolina 
3-8, 10 District only District defined 
as impaired 
Moderate Yes 10 1990 3 
South Dakota 2,4,5,8,9,11 Test reports None None No   1 
Tennessee 3-8, 9 Test reports Accreditation Weak Yes 9  1.5 
Texas 3-8,10 Report cards School ratings, 
interventions 




Utah 3,5,8,11 None Accreditation Weak No 10 2007 1 
Vermont 2,4,8,10 School reports Identify schools 
for assistance 
Weak No   1 






No   2 
Washington 2-10 School reports Accreditation Weak No 10 2008 1 
West Virginia 3-8 Performance 
audits 
Intervention Strong No   3.5 







No 11 2004 2 
Wyoming 4,8,11 Only district  Accreditation Weak No  2001 1 
 
*Alternative specification of index, as per Margaret Goertz, in parentheses. 
** Table borrowed from Carnoy and Loeb (2002), with permission from the authors.  
 
